Is the “average Pigouvian tax” robust to the size of the group of polluters?

We study the “average Pigouvian tax” (APT), an ambient-based policy instrument that requires polluters to cooperate to achieve the social optimum. In this paper, we are interested in the group size variation and its effect of the APT efficiency. Indeed, in the field, the implementation of the instru...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inReview of agricultural, food and environmental studies Vol. 102; no. 3; pp. 285 - 296
Main Authors Sarr, Hamet, Bchir, Mohamed Ali, Cochard, François, Rozan, Anne
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 04.05.2021
Edition2134
Subjects
Ambient-based taxes
Cooperation
Environmental Economics and Policy
Nonpoint source pollution
Size effect
sucker’s payoff
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN2425-6897
2425-6897
DOI10.22004/ag.econ.329945

Cover

More Information
Summary:We study the “average Pigouvian tax” (APT), an ambient-based policy instrument that requires polluters to cooperate to achieve the social optimum. In this paper, we are interested in the group size variation and its effect of the APT efficiency. Indeed, in the field, the implementation of the instrument will face group sizes that can vary from a few to a large number of farmers.We find that increasing the size of the group reduces cooperation among subjects, thereby reducing the efficiency of the instrument. We also show that when the sucker’s cost is lowered, the instrument can converge towards the social optimum.
ISSN:2425-6897
2425-6897
DOI:10.22004/ag.econ.329945