Pairing Games and Markets

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also introduce th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors Alkan, Ahmet, Tuncay, Alparslan
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published 01.05.2014
Edition824
Series48.2014
CCSD
Subjects
Bargaining Set
Bilateral Transaction
Coalition Formation
Competitive Equilibrium
Gallai Edmonds Decomposition
Institutional and Behavioral Economics
Market Design
NTU Assignment Game
Roommate Problem
Stable Matching
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Summary:Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here.
DOI:10.22004/ag.econ.172704