Headscarves, Judicial Activism, and Democracy: The 2007-08 Constitutional Crisis in Turkey

How are we to understand and analyse the constitutional tension in Turkey between the judiciary and the political sphere? In this article the issue is mirrored in the political crisis which started in April 2007 with the nomination by the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Abdu...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe European legacy, toward new paradigms Vol. 15; no. 4; p. 467
Main Author Höjelid, Stefan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 2010
Subjects
constitution
headscarf
hegemonic preservation
juristocracy
party closure
Political science
SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP
secularism
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Socialvetenskap
Statsvetenskap
Turkey
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Summary:How are we to understand and analyse the constitutional tension in Turkey between the judiciary and the political sphere? In this article the issue is mirrored in the political crisis which started in April 2007 with the nomination by the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Abdullah Gül as a candidate for the presidency. The more detailed empirical background consists primarily of the dress code problematique including the matter of party closure. Theoretically the ‘hegemonic preservation’ thesis elaborated by Ran Hirschl turned out to be a useful instrument when it comes to understanding and explaining the political crisis mentioned as well as the origin of  the so called new constitutionalism. This is illustrated by the judicial activism in the headscarf affair as well as by the eagerness of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), as the political representative of the secular establishment, to play the ‘Atatürk card’ and to submit the protection of their interest to an independent judiciary and not to the uncertainties of the mechanisms of majoritarian democracy. However, my analysis also shows that Hirschl’s thesis, with regard to the current Turkish case, is too static and should be complemented with a more dynamic perspective of constitutional politics as a repeated game. One example of this is that even if the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) declared the constitutional amendment on the headscarf invalid and voted for an economic penalty against AKP, TCC did not close the party down.  
ISSN:1084-8770
1470-1316
DOI:10.1080/10848770.2010.489321