Using Clues From Libya To Study a Nuclear Mystery

In interviews this week, administration officials and foreign diplomats disclosed that Libyan officials had also surrendered financial ledgers to the United States that provide a guide to the front companies involved in the nuclear network set up by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist. One la...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe New York times
Main Author DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD
Format Newspaper Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, N.Y New York Times Company 31.03.2005
EditionLate Edition (East Coast)
Subjects
Black markets
Evidence
Investigations
Khan, Abdul Qadeer
Nuclear weapons
Uranium
United States
WASHINGTON, March 30
Libya
US
North Korea
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Summary:In interviews this week, administration officials and foreign diplomats disclosed that Libyan officials had also surrendered financial ledgers to the United States that provide a guide to the front companies involved in the nuclear network set up by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist. One large payment, American officials contend, was directed to North Korea, presumably for the uranium hexafluoride that arrived in Tripoli in 2001. But American and foreign officials who have seen the financial documents or been briefed on them say they do not prove a direct payment from Libya to the North Korean government. The story began in late 2003, when Libya surrendered its nuclear program and led American, British and I.A.E.A. officials to the cask of uranium. It was flown to Washington in early 2004. In February 2004, Malaysia published a report -- based on interviews with Buhari Sayed Abu Tahir , the chief operating officer of Mr. Khan's network -- that the uranium hexafluoride had been flown to Libya aboard a Pakistani airplane in 2001. The findings of the Malaysian report, and the involvement of the Khan network in the uranium shipment, were widely reported. Some experts have questioned that conclusion, saying it is unclear whether North Korea made the uranium hexafluoride itself, or merely supplied the raw uranium to Pakistan, which then made the highly toxic chemical. It is well known that the North routinely makes a precursor known as uranium tetraflouride at a plant near Yongbyon. Federal experts said converting that to the final product was relatively simple. ''It's not a big step for North Korea to make uranium hexafluoride,'' said a nuclear scientist who regularly consults for intelligence agencies.
ISSN:0362-4331