Dampen nuclear dangers in India and Pakistan ALL Edition

• Published in: The Christian Science monitor (1983)
• Main Author: Rose Gottemoeller and Thomas Graham Jr
• Format: Newspaper Article
• Language: English
• Published: Boston, Mass The Christian Science Publishing Society (d/b/a "The Christian Science Monitor"), trusteeship under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 15.11.2001
• Subjects: Arms control & disarmament; Nuclear weapons; Terrorism; Treaties; Pakistan; WASHINGTON; India
• ISSN: 0882-7729; 2166-3262

Since the war on terrorism began in earnest Oct. 7, pressure has been building on Pakistan, creating a risk of destabilization accompanied by the threat that Taliban sympathizers might try to steal Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials. Equally threatening is the possibility that the crisis could spiral into a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The announcement that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal was dispatched to more secure, secret locations is reassuring, but only a temporary solution. Some way must be found to associate India and Pakistan with the NPT regime. Since as a practical matter neither of these states is prepared, under the current circumstances, to eliminate its nuclear weapons program, NPT membership as nonnuclear-weapons states is not possible. Nor can they be NPT nuclear weapons states, as this would require the treaty to be amended, which would risk further unraveling of the regime. As a result of these commitments, India and Pakistan would have a settlement of the nuclear issue with the world community and an acknowledgment of their status through association with the NPT regime. To symbolize this, the protocol could be signed by India and Pakistan as well as the NPT Depository States (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, which, since the 1960s, have been considered the general managers of the NPT regime).