A Two-Tier System Ends Team Blackmail NASSAU AND SUFFOLK Edition

IN AN ERA when professional sports franchises play musical chairs with the cities that support them, we are called to question why cities would give millions to teams that show no more loyalty than a pet iguana. Why so few teams? At the highest level of competition in each sport there is a single le...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inNewsday
Main Author By Philip K. Porter. Philip K. Porter is a professor of economics at the University of South Florida
Format Newspaper Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Long Island, N.Y Newsday LLC 18.09.1996
EditionCombined editions
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Summary:IN AN ERA when professional sports franchises play musical chairs with the cities that support them, we are called to question why cities would give millions to teams that show no more loyalty than a pet iguana. Why so few teams? At the highest level of competition in each sport there is a single league, and the owners limit the number of teams to increase their value. Two or more independent leagues produce the unsatisfactory result that there is not a single national champion, and too many teams lowers the quality of the game by diluting the pool of scarce talent. Play in the second tier draws less attention and less revenue, pays lower salaries and consequently attracts less talented players. The talent concentration problem is solved by limiting the number of teams in the premier league. The entry problem is solved by replacing the bottom few teams in the premier league at the end of the season with the best teams from the second-tier league. No one who wants to field a team is denied entry into the second league and a team need only play very well to earn the right to compete for a national title.