FARC and the costs of kidnapping

This article analyzes, from an agency theory perspective, the effects produced on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by both political kidnapping as a long-run political strategy, and its long duration caused by Alvaro Uribe's government decision to not accept prisoner exchanges....

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Bibliographic Details
Published inRevista de economía institucional Vol. 14; no. 27; pp. 147 - 164
Main Authors del Pilar Castillo V., Maria, Balbinotto, Giacomo
Format Journal Article
LanguageSpanish
Published 01.01.2012
Subjects
Ethics
Hazards
Kidnapping
Principal-Agent Models
Prisoners
Terrorist Organizations
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Summary:This article analyzes, from an agency theory perspective, the effects produced on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by both political kidnapping as a long-run political strategy, and its long duration caused by Alvaro Uribe's government decision to not accept prisoner exchanges. These elements led to a separation between the FARC leaders' objectives and the goals of its field commanders. In such a case, the connection between them reveals the existence of a moral hazard problem which has become stronger and more harmful over time. Adapted from the source document.
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ISSN:0124-5996