An Integrated Agency-Resource Dependence View of the Influence of Directors' Human and Relational Capital on Firms' R&D Spending

• Published in: Journal of management studies Vol. 48; no. 6; p. 1196
• Main Authors: Dalziel, Thomas, Gentry, Richard J, Bowerman, Michael
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.09.2011
• Subjects: Agency theory; Automobile sales; Boards of directors; Directors; Entrepreneurs; Entrepreneurship; R&D; Research & development; Research & development expenditures; Studies
• ISSN: 0022-2380; 1467-6486

In this paper, we contribute to the agency and corporate entrepreneurship literatures by focusing on board antecedents of research and development (R&D). Some researchers in this stream find outside directors negatively influence R&D spending, yet popular opinion suggests boards should be composed of outsiders, and at the same time, firms should be innovative and entrepreneurial. We begin to address this conflict by extending agency theory and incorporating resource dependence views in order to explore the influence of a wider range of director characteristics on R&D spending, a precursor of innovation and entrepreneurial activity. Our empirical results demonstrate that aspects of directors' human and relational capital (e.g. education, entrepreneurial finance experience, technical experience, and interlocks) significantly influence R&D spending. Our findings illustrate that boards can be configured to improve efficiencies, thereby reducing R&D spending, and/or to augment R&D spending. They reveal the merits of considering inside and outside directors separately and show how the independence (i.e. inside/outside status) of directors shapes the effect of their human and relational capital on R&D spending. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]