Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements

We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable properties can be ensured under opacity in a robust sense. A proper...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inarXiv.org
Main Authors Grigoryan, Aram, Möller, Markus
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published Ithaca Cornell University Library, arXiv.org 08.08.2024
Subjects
Opacity
Robustness
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Summary:We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable properties can be ensured under opacity in a robust sense. A property can be guaranteed under an opaque announcement if every mechanism compatible with it satisfies the property. We find an impossibility result: strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed under any level of opacity. In contrast, in some environments, weak Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness can be guaranteed under opacity.
ISSN:2331-8422