How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment

We test in the laboratory four mechanisms whereby group identification might affect redistribution in representative democracies. For voters, group identification can give rise to a preference for own-group payoffs, for electing an own-group candidate, and could be used to assess candidate-sincerity...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc
Main Authors Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P, Manifold, Emma, Matakos, Konstantinos, Xefteris, Dimitrios
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.01.2022
Subjects
Political representation
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Summary:We test in the laboratory four mechanisms whereby group identification might affect redistribution in representative democracies. For voters, group identification can give rise to a preference for own-group payoffs, for electing an own-group candidate, and could be used to assess candidate-sincerity. For candidates, identity might affect the optimal campaign platform. There is evidence to support all four. The influence of own-group pay-offs has been studied before, but the other mechanisms have not. These new mechanisms combine to make redistribution depend on a hitherto unrecognized factor: the political representation of the minority group.