A fair procedure in a marriage market

We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields astable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching, and in fact, is a Rawlsian stable matching if the matching market is "balance...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc
Main Authors Romero-Medina, Antonio, Kuvalekar, Aditya Vijay
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.01.2021
Subjects
Algorithms
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Summary:We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields astable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching, and in fact, is a Rawlsian stable matching if the matching market is "balanced." Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets in which fairness considerations are important.