On signaling disability in anonymous economic games
We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects...
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Published in | IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc |
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Main Authors | , , , |
Format | Paper |
Language | English |
Published |
St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
01.01.2020
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects are driven by the specific nature of the disability not by the difference per se. The evidence regarding the effect of acquired versus permanent disability is mixed. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) |
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DOI: | 10.1016/j.joep.2020.10227 |