RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW

• Published in: Tort trial & insurance practice law journal Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 185 - 229
• Main Authors: Amy, Michael T, Gitz, Audrey E, Gold, Megen M, Guthrie, Justin G, Hamilton, Christopher F, Jansson, Chase Alexandra, Kuebel, Sara B, Mau, Donald A, McCullough, Juliette, Miller, Carra, Mulrane, Kelly E, Saylor, Casey M, Skopec, Allison N, Woody, W Benjamin
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Chicago American Bar Association 01.04.2021
• Subjects: Back pain; Declaratory judgments; Deposition; District courts; Employers; Evidence; Federal court decisions; Injuries; Maritime law; State court decisions; United States > US; Maryland
• ISSN: 1543-3234; 1943-118X

[...]of his alleged incident, the seaman suffered injuries to his lumbar spine, specifically at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels.2 Following the incident, the seaman sent a demand for maintenance and cure to the employer seeking payment for his medical treatment to his lower back. The employer subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration from the district court that it was not responsible for maintenance and cure payments or, conversely, a determination regarding past and future liability for maintenance and cure generally.3 In response, the seaman filed an answer and counter-claim asserting Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims, as well as re-asserting his claim for maintenance and cure.4 After completing discovery and deposing several physicians, the employer filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing that the seaman's claims for maintenance and cure should be dismissed, because he willfully concealed and/or misrepresented pre-existing injuries to his lumbar spine during his pre-employment application process-in accordance with the well-established McCorpen defense.5 In analyzing the three prongs of McCorpen, the district court concluded that the plaintiff failed to disclose medical information to the employer and that this information was material to the employer's decision to hire him.6 As for the third prong, the district court noted that the employer had also satisfied the causality prong. "11 The court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had not adopted a rule regarding whether only one employer can be held liable for Jones Act purposes.12 It analyzed rulings of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, and the United States District Court of Maryland, noting a circuit split wherein the Ninth Circuit has held that "there can be no more than one 'employer' for purposes of the Jones Act" (a holding which was followed by the District of Maryland), while the Fifth Circuit has held the opposite.13 Finally, after stating that the First Circuit would more likely adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, the court reasoned that the identity of the employer(s) should be an issue of fact for the jury.14 Therefore, the court denied the defendants' motion.15 In Knudson v. M/V American Spirit,16 the plaintiff originally filed an action in 2014 alleging personal injuries sustained while serving as a seaman on M/V AMERICAN SPIRIT operating in the Great Lakes region. In denying ASC's motion, the court determined that ASC had acted as plaintiff's employer in various ways, had paid maintenance to plaintiff previously, and, crucially, it was ASC's actions that gave rise to plaintiff's request for punitive damages. [...]the court concluded that ASC's financial condition is relevant to the punitive damage's inquiry.17 Further, defendants' motion urged exclusion of any evidence, testimony, or argument to suggest an amount or calculation of punitive damages that would exceed a 1:1 ratio to any compensatory damages.