EARNINGS MANAGEMENT, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND THE FIRM VALUE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

There are always conflicts of interest between managers (agents) and owners (leaders), but not necessarily the degree of disagreement. This is due to a conflict of interest or a division of responsibility. The purpose of this research is to look at the effects of earnings management and ownership st...

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Published inJournal of Management Information and Decision Sciences Vol. 24; no. 7; pp. 1 - 14
Main Authors Almari, Mohammad Odeh Salem, Weshah, Sulaiman Raji Sulaiman, Saleh, Mousa Mohammad Abdullah, Aldboush, Hassan Hamad Hasan, Ali, Basel J A
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Allied Business Academies 01.01.2021
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Summary:There are always conflicts of interest between managers (agents) and owners (leaders), but not necessarily the degree of disagreement. This is due to a conflict of interest or a division of responsibility. The purpose of this research is to look at the effects of earnings management and ownership structure on business value. The public firms included for this research were listed on the Amman Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2019. The purposive sampling strategy is used in this research to examine the sample, providing seven businesses as the test sample. In the regression analysis, multiple regression and descriptive statistics were applied. According to the conclusions of this research, earning management, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership have minimal effect on business value. Aside from that, the findings suggest that family ownership has a significant favorable influence on business worth. To maximize the firm's valuation, it is recommended that these firms strictly adhere to the CG mechanism as a requirement. The function of CG as an independent or moderating variable, on the other hand, is still debatable.
ISSN:1524-7252
1532-5806