EARNINGS MANAGEMENT, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND THE FIRM VALUE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
There are always conflicts of interest between managers (agents) and owners (leaders), but not necessarily the degree of disagreement. This is due to a conflict of interest or a division of responsibility. The purpose of this research is to look at the effects of earnings management and ownership st...
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Published in | Journal of Management Information and Decision Sciences Vol. 24; no. 7; pp. 1 - 14 |
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Main Authors | , , , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
London
Allied Business Academies
01.01.2021
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | There are always conflicts of interest between managers (agents) and owners (leaders), but not necessarily the degree of disagreement. This is due to a conflict of interest or a division of responsibility. The purpose of this research is to look at the effects of earnings management and ownership structure on business value. The public firms included for this research were listed on the Amman Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2019. The purposive sampling strategy is used in this research to examine the sample, providing seven businesses as the test sample. In the regression analysis, multiple regression and descriptive statistics were applied. According to the conclusions of this research, earning management, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership have minimal effect on business value. Aside from that, the findings suggest that family ownership has a significant favorable influence on business worth. To maximize the firm's valuation, it is recommended that these firms strictly adhere to the CG mechanism as a requirement. The function of CG as an independent or moderating variable, on the other hand, is still debatable. |
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ISSN: | 1524-7252 1532-5806 |