Privacy, technology, and terrorism: Bartnicki, Kyllo, and the normative struggle behind competing claims to solitude and security

The 2000-2001 term of the Supreme Court produced at its end two excellent examples of the continuing disagreement that swirls around the intersection of two fundamental propositions--one normative, the other scientific: privacy and modern sensing and surveillance technologies. In the context of the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEmory law journal Vol. 51; no. 4; p. 1469
Main Authors Terrell, Timothy P, Jacobs, Anne R
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Atlanta Emory University, School of Law 01.10.2002
Subjects
Court decisions
Law
Legislation
Privacy
Technology
Terrorism
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Summary:The 2000-2001 term of the Supreme Court produced at its end two excellent examples of the continuing disagreement that swirls around the intersection of two fundamental propositions--one normative, the other scientific: privacy and modern sensing and surveillance technologies. In the context of the newly declared campaign against terrorism, the topic has taken on a new seriousness and urgency. Terrell and Jacobs argue that the concept of privacy is now and always will be controversial and that there exists no deep theoretical foundation for it that could serve to end the debate about is, no matter how hard we try. In turn, they believe that this continuing disagreement about the "ought" of privacy will sustain a similarly continuing debate about the "is" of current and future technology.
ISSN:0094-4076
2163-324X