A Game Theoretical Analysis of Slotting Allowance

In this paper I use a game theoretical model to analyze the economic effects for the situation in which the retailers ask their upstream suppliers to pay the slotting allowances (also known as the shelf space rental fees) to obtain retailer patronage. The retailers are modeled as the Stackelberg lea...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inTai Da Guan Li Lun Cong Vol. 6; no. 2; p. 61
Main Authors Ku-Lan, Chung, 鍾谷蘭
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Taiwan National Taiwan University Press, NTU College of Management 01.08.1995
Subjects
Economic models
Fees & charges
Game theory
Retailing industry
Vendor supplier relations
Taiwan
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Summary:In this paper I use a game theoretical model to analyze the economic effects for the situation in which the retailers ask their upstream suppliers to pay the slotting allowances (also known as the shelf space rental fees) to obtain retailer patronage. The retailers are modeled as the Stackelberg leaders, and the upstream suppliers fpllowers, to characterize the current market situation in Taiwan. It is shown that under certain assumptions the slotting allowances should do no damage to the consumers' welfare and social welfare. These findings provide policy implications for the Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan.
ISSN:1018-1601
2410-2490