A constitutional view of legislative pay 1. Introduction

The pay of state legislators highlights the effects of constitutional rules as pay levels are often specified by constitutional or some lesser institutional rule. In general, it is safe to say that the public, when informed, generally disapproves of pay raises for their legislators. The outcry is of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPublic choice Vol. 67; no. 1; p. 81
Main Author Sollars, David L
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Leiden Springer Nature B.V 01.10.1990
Subjects
Compensation
Constitutional law
Constitutions
Councils
Labor supply
Legislators
Legislatures
Personal income
Provisions
Raises
Referendums
State government
Variables
Wages & salaries
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Summary:The pay of state legislators highlights the effects of constitutional rules as pay levels are often specified by constitutional or some lesser institutional rule. In general, it is safe to say that the public, when informed, generally disapproves of pay raises for their legislators. The outcry is often, "There ought to be a law!" The question is, however, what type of law would be most effective? In this note, an empirical model is presented which suggests that constitutional rules are more effective constraints on legislative pay than are postconstitutional rules.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101