On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize's material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the behavior evolutionarily stable p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc
Main Authors Boudreau, James W, Shunda, Nicholas
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.01.2010
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Summary:We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize's material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the behavior evolutionarily stable preferences induce and evolutionarily stable strategies.