A Model of Duopolistic Unionism Exhibiting Downward Wage Rigidity

This paper presents a simple model of sequential wage setting by two unions, each of which is attached to a firm in a duopolistic output market. The authors find that, for a large range of unanticipated downward demand shocks, the equilibrium exhibits downward wage rigidity. Neither union chooses to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc
Main Authors Kovenock, D, Widdows, K, Dworkin, J B
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.01.1988
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Summary:This paper presents a simple model of sequential wage setting by two unions, each of which is attached to a firm in a duopolistic output market. The authors find that, for a large range of unanticipated downward demand shocks, the equilibrium exhibits downward wage rigidity. Neither union chooses to alter its wage even though wages are flexible. This occurs despite the reduction in employment accompanying these shocks.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)