The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

• Published in: IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc
• Main Authors: Yuan, Huiping, Miller, Stephen M
• Format: Paper
• Language: English
• Published: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.01.2009
• Subjects: Central banks

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).