On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda 1

In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of "direct democracy" is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc
Main Authors CHRISTIAN, Robin, FELLOWS, Mike, ROSAMOND, Frances, SLINKO, Arkadii
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.01.2006
Subjects
Lobbying
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Summary:In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of "direct democracy" is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose.