Competitive Pressure and Lying in Search Markets

We study a labor market in which principals and agents must search for a trading partner, and agents have private information about the value of a match. We show that competitive pressure can induce agents to lie and overstate the value of the match. This leads to insufficient frictional unemploymen...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc
Main Authors Baker, Matthew, Nyman, Ingmar
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.01.2009
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Summary:We study a labor market in which principals and agents must search for a trading partner, and agents have private information about the value of a match. We show that competitive pressure can induce agents to lie and overstate the value of the match. This leads to insufficient frictional unemployment and search, and lower average utility. The resulting social loss increases with the accuracy of the private information and the ease with which matches are created, and decreases with the time-value of money. An unemployment subsidy can eliminate the inefficiency. Changing how the surplus is split between principal and agent, by contrast, has no effect on the agents' incentive to lie.