Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.(This abstract was borrowed from ano...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc
Main Authors Feldman, Allan M, Serrano, Roberto
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 01.01.2007
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Summary:In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)