Reducing Severance Costs or Subsidizing Permanent Job Creation: Which Policy Is More Effective to Reduce Duality?

This paper introduces endogenous on-the-job training in the job creation and destruction model of the search and matching type by García-Pérez and Osuna (Dual labour markets and the tenure distribution: Reducing severance pay or introducing a single contract, 2014). The objective is to compare the e...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics. The open-access, open-assessment e-journal Vol. 9; no. 17; p. 1
Main Author Osuna, Victoria
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Berlin Walter de Gruyter GmbH 07.07.2015
Subjects
Cost reduction
Costs
Employment
Fines & penalties
Flexibility
Inservice training
Job creation
Labor market
Market segmentation
Reforms
Severance pay
Studies
Subsidies
Tenure
Unemployment
Wages & salaries
Workers
Spain
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Summary:This paper introduces endogenous on-the-job training in the job creation and destruction model of the search and matching type by García-Pérez and Osuna (Dual labour markets and the tenure distribution: Reducing severance pay or introducing a single contract, 2014). The objective is to compare the effects of subsidizing permanent job creation with that of reducing the severance cost gap between permanent contracts (PCs) and temporary contracts (TCs) as a strategy to reduce labour market duality between PCs and TCs. The 2006 and 2012 Spanish labour market reforms are used as a benchmark. The results point to fact that subsidizing permanent job creation may not be the best option from a fiscal point of view to reduce labour market segmentation between PCs and TCs. In particular, the results of introducing the subsidized "entrepreneurs' permanent contract" (EPC) in the 2012 labour market reform may have involved substantial deadweight effects. In fact, the reduction of the severance cost gap to a number close to 15 days of wages per year of service (p.y.o.s.) may generate the same effects, provided dismissals for objective reasons are effectively made easier to justify and firms make use of that option instead of agreeing to an indemnity closer to the amount paid for unfair dismissals. Finally, the model also shows the relevance of designing appropriate penalties for those firms that do not comply with the obligations that subsidies involve.
ISSN:1864-6042
1864-6042