Does High Leverage Impact Earnings Management? Evidence from Non-cash Mergers and Acquisitions

Using a sample of US non-cash acquirers, we find significant evidence of upward earnings management prior to announcing merger and acquisition deals. In this event study, we adopt an industry-adjusted leverage proxy. No evidence of premerger earnings management is found in highly leveraged firms. Th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of financial and economic practice Vol. 12; no. 1; p. 17
Main Authors Alsharairi, Malek, Salama, Aly
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Peoria Bradley University 01.04.2012
Subjects
Accounting
Accruals
Acquisitions & mergers
Corporate governance
Discretionary power
Earnings management
Impact analysis
Leverage
Profits
Stock prices
Stockholders
Stocks
Studies
Valuation
United States > US
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Summary:Using a sample of US non-cash acquirers, we find significant evidence of upward earnings management prior to announcing merger and acquisition deals. In this event study, we adopt an industry-adjusted leverage proxy. No evidence of premerger earnings management is found in highly leveraged firms. The results indicate significant evidence of a negative relationship between earnings management and leverage. The evidence remains robust after replacing the leverage proxy with a high-low leverage binary variable, as well as after controlling for the relative size of the deal and profitability of acquirers. No evidence on earnings management by cash acquirers is reported. These findings are consistent with Jensen's Control Hypothesis as well as advocate the view that creditors play crucial roles in monitoring the firm, which would increase the credibility of corporate reports and restrict the use of management's discretionary power to manipulate earnings prior to special business events such as mergers and acquisitions. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
ISSN:1937-6820