I Think, Therefore IR? Psychology, Biology and the Notion of Praxis
In his spirited defence of a thick constructivist approach to the study of international relations, Friedrich Kratochwil repeatedly invites us to adopt the perspective of the first-person plural. Without a conception of ‘we’, there is no language or discourse, no possibility for authority or justice...
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| Published in | Praxis as a Perspective on International Politics p. 145 |
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| Main Author | |
| Format | Book Chapter |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Bristol University Press
26.04.2022
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| Edition | 1 |
| Online Access | Get full text |
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| Summary: | In his spirited defence of a thick constructivist approach to the study of international relations, Friedrich Kratochwil repeatedly invites us to adopt the perspective of the first-person plural. Without a conception of ‘we’, there is no language or discourse, no possibility for authority or justice, no collective sense of right and wrong. But how does the constructed ‘we’ relate to the psychological and biological agent, ‘I’, who is engaged in practice?¹
For Kratochwil, ‘we-intentionality’ cannot be reduced to the antecedent beliefs or feelings of individuals. For as long as members of a group accept the legitimacy of decisions made on |
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| ISBN: | 1529220467 9781529220469 |
| DOI: | 10.2307/j.ctv2fjwq5v.13 |