The developmental roots of compromised mentalization in complex mental health disturbances of adulthood: An attachment-based conceptualization
Metacognitive function refers to how individuals make sense of their own and others' behaviour in terms of mental states and their utilization of this capacity to solve problems and to cope with speci®c mental states that are a source of distress (Semerari et al., 2003). Related to this, mental...
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Published in | Metacognition and Severe Adult Mental Disorders pp. 63 - 80 |
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Format | Book Chapter |
Language | English |
Published |
Routledge
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
DOI | 10.4324/9780203855782-10 |
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Summary: | Metacognitive function refers to how individuals make sense of their own
and others' behaviour in terms of mental states and their utilization of this
capacity to solve problems and to cope with speci®c mental states that are a
source of distress (Semerari et al., 2003). Related to this, mentalization
which has been de®ned as the `process by which an individual implicitly or
explicitly interprets his own actions and those of others as meaningful on the
basis of intentional mental states (e.g. desires, needs, feelings, beliefs and
reasons)' (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004: 302). Problems in metacognition
have been implicated in schizophrenia (Frith, 1992), borderline personality
disorder (BPD; Fonagy and Bateman, 2006) and personality disorders in
general (see Colle et al., this volume, Chapter 11), complex trauma and post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Liotti and Prunetti, this volume, Chapter
12). This chapter explores the developmental roots of compromised metacognition and mentalization in severe adult mental disorders. It focuses on
how metacognitive processes have been differentially conceptualized in
different adult psychological disturbances and explores how an attachmentbased approach to understanding the development of metacognition can
help us understand these processes from a normative perspective. This
approach is in line with Sroufe (1997: 252) who argued that `behavioural
and emotional disturbance is viewed as a developmental construction,
re¯ecting a succession of adaptations that evolve over time in accord with
the same principles that govern normal development'. I propose that these
normative developmental pathways, which are important to metacognition,
are compromised amongst people who are later diagnosed with complex
mental health problems, particularly trauma-related disorders, personality
disorders and psychotic disorders including schizophrenia. These groups
of disorders in many ways typify the tension between a predominant medical
model which emphasizes the interplay between neurobiology and environment (as in schizophrenia) versus a developmental model which places
emphasis on the interplay between the environment and the individual's
history of successive adaptations in the context of risk and protective factors
and the individual's progressively active role in these adaptations over time.The chapter will conclude by considering the implications of this analysis
for the further development of research and theory of metacognition in
complex adult psychological problems. I propose that personality disorders
and psychotic disorders including schizophrenia can be conceived as
disorders of affect regulation underpinned by weakened or compromised
metacognition and mentalization. A crucial implication of this model is that
change is possible at many points despite earlier unsuccessful attempts at
adaptation and the return to positive functioning also remains possible. This
has important implications for the development of psychological therapies
focused upon recovery from complex mental health problems. |
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DOI: | 10.4324/9780203855782-10 |