Assessing the security of a clean-slate Internet architecture

• Published in: 2012 20th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP) pp. 1 - 6
• Main Authors: Boddapati, G., Day, J., Matta, I., Chitkushev, L.
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Published: IEEE 01.10.2012
• Subjects: Cryptography; Receivers; Resource management
• ISBN: 1467324450; 9781467324458
• ISSN: 1092-1648; 2643-3303
• DOI: 10.1109/ICNP.2012.6459947

The TCP/IP architecture was originally designed without taking security measures into consideration. Over the years, it has been subjected to many attacks, which has led to many patches to counter them. Our investigations into the fundamental principles of networking have shown that carefully following an abstract model of Inter-Process Communication (IPC) addresses many problems [1]. Guided by this IPC principle, we designed a clean-slate Recursive InterNetwork Architecture (RINA) [2]. In this paper, we show how, without the aid of cryptographic techniques, the bare-bones architecture of RINA can resist most of the security attacks faced by TCP/IP, and of course, is only more secure if cryptographic techniques are employed. Specifically, the RINA model decouples different concerns that makes it more resistant to transport-level attacks: (1) RINA decouples authentication from connection management, thus transport-level attacks are limited to "insider" attacks, and (2) RINA decouples transport port allocation and access control from data synchronization and transfer, thus making transport-level attacks much harder to mount. Using typical field lengths in packet headers, we analyze how hard it is for an intruder to compromise RINA.