Concrete Universals and Spatial Relations

According to strong immanent realism, proposed for instance by David M. Armstrong, universals are concrete, located in their instances. E.J. Lowe and Douglas Ehring have presented arguments to the effect that strong immanent realism is incoherent. Cody Gilmore has defended strong immanent realism ag...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy Vol. 11; no. 1; p. 57
Main Authors Hakkarainen, Jani, Keinänen, Markku, Keskinen, Antti
Format Paper
LanguageEnglish
Published Odsjek za filozofiju Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci 10.05.2016
Subjects
abstract
concrete
metaphysics
realism
universals
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:According to strong immanent realism, proposed for instance by David M. Armstrong, universals are concrete, located in their instances. E.J. Lowe and Douglas Ehring have presented arguments to the effect that strong immanent realism is incoherent. Cody Gilmore has defended strong immanent realism against the charge of incoherence. Gilmore’s argument has thus far remained unanswered. We argue that Gilmore’s response to the charge of incoherence is an ad hoc move without support independent of strong immanent realism itself. We conclude that strong immanent realism remains under the threat of incoherence posed by Lowe and Ehring.
Bibliography:160749
ISSN:1845-8475
1849-0514