Ep iph any in t he G ame of 2 1

Does performance in strategic settings depend on whether players realize that an optimal way to play is feasible? We introduce a zero-sum game of perfect information, simple enough to allow computation of optimal play yet sufficiently complicated that most participants initially fail. This borderlin...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 75; no. 2; pp. 132 - 143
Main Authors Dufwenberg, Martin, Sundaram, Ramya, Butler, David J.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 2010
Subjects
Dominant strategies
Epiphany
Game theory
Learning
Mimicking
Reasoning
Learning
Dominant strategies
C7
Epiphany
Reasoning
C9
Mimicking
Game theory
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Summary:Does performance in strategic settings depend on whether players realize that an optimal way to play is feasible? We introduce a zero-sum game of perfect information, simple enough to allow computation of optimal play yet sufficiently complicated that most participants initially fail. This borderline solvability-by-humans makes it a suitable research tool for experimentally evaluating if play is affected by whether it dawns on a subject that an analytic solution may be possible. Our design includes a way to control for such insight. We also examine how learning transfer across games affects subsequent learning towards optimization. Applications include the facilitation of learning how to plan ahead when actions are needed today but the consequences are temporally distant.
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2010.03.025