Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction
Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning beca...
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| Published in | Philosophia scientiae Vol. 19; no. 1; pp. 35 - 43 |
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| Main Author | |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | German |
| Published |
Éditions Kimé
01.03.2015
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| Online Access | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning because they typically see emotion as belonging to the context of discovery rather than of justification. I suggest, however, that recent work in epistemology challenges the authority usually granted the context distinction, taking reliabilism as my example. Emotion may be seen as playing a reliable role in the formation, which for the reliabilist also means the justification of scientific beliefs. |
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| ISSN: | 1281-2463 1775-4283 |
| DOI: | 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1036 |