Fenomenologia in "prima" e in "terza" persona: Searle e Dennett critici di Husserl

• Published in: Rivista internazionale di filosofia e psicologia Vol. 5; no. 3; pp. 267 - 288
• Main Author: Federica Buongiorno
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: German
• Published: Mimesis Edizioni, Milano 01.12.2014
• Subjects: Analytic Philosophy; Cognitive Sciences; Phenomenology; Philosophy of Mind; Theory of Consciousness
• ISSN: 2039-4667; 2239-2629
• DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2014.0022

“First” and “Third” Person Phenomenology: Searle and Dennett Critics of Husserl - In this paper I compare Searle’s and Dennett’s philosophies of mind with Husserl’s theory of consciousness. My aim is to show how they modified the phenomenological concept of intentionality turning it into a “third-person” model of description. This change leads to problematic consequences concerning mainly (i) the distinction between a mental act and its content, and the related criticism of the representational theory of mind; (ii) the Cartesian Theater argument and the related Homunculus argument as well as the claim that the notion of subjectivity needs to be dismantled; (iii) the rejection of the Unconscious. I my view Searle’s and Dennett’s positions follow from embracing a contradictory notion of reductionism, which is also implicit in the developments of “naturalized phenomenology” and neurophenomenology. These difficulties cannot be solved by adapting or applying the phenomenological method to cognitive sciences, nor even by merely returning to Husserl’s theory. Rather, we need to determine what specific problems can be phenomenologically addressed in a scientific context: for instance the temporal structure of consciousness and the issue of the unconscious contents of mind.