Economic analysis of marine industrial fisheries

• Main Author: Torres, Julio Alejandro Pena
• Format: Dissertation
• Language: English
• Published: Queen Mary University of London 1996
• Subjects: Economics; Long-run sustainability; Marine industrial fisheries; Oligopoly; Regualtion

This thesis is a collection of essays on the problem of overfishing in multifirm fisheries with a common property fish stock. We focus on the case of marine industrial fisheries, where the costs of preventing free riding tend to preclude cooperative harvesting. We study the overfishing problem by analysing harvesting incentives that stem from variations in (i) technological (cost, production and biological growth) functions, (ii) institutional factors (access schemes, regulatory agencies' instruments and their monitoring and enforcement powers, harvesting competition), and (iii) objective functions (private firms' planning horizons, welfare functions). Chapter 2 discusses conditions under which a fishing collapse can occur and examines the commonly held argument that fishing collapse is a public bad. Chapter 3 studies Chilean fishing regulations over the last five decades. The regulator's persistent inability to enforce annual quotas is analysed. Distributive disputes and triggered lobbying powers are examined. The late 1980s controversies over a new Chilean fishing law are analysed in-depth from this perspective. Chapter 4 explains the main motivations and key assumptions leading us to the oligopoly harvesting models of chapters 5 (static setting) and 6 (dynamic setting). These models focus on a deterministic single fish species and a single sector harvesting fishery composed of profit maximizing and price taking private firms that compete with each other by following non-cooperative harvesting strategies. These models examine the overfishing rankings that result from comparing Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. First best and second best welfare benchmarks are considered. The Cournot-Nash setting is intended to illustrate a large number oligopolistic fishery, while the Stackelberg equilibrium is meant to be a first approximation to analyse the implications of harvesting fisheries subject to industrial concentration. Empirical evidence suggesting the presence of industrial concentration in a series of important marine industrial fisheries is described in chapters 3 and 4.