On sybil-proof mechanisms

We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and sybil-proof mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors Pan, Minghao, Mamageishvili, Akaki, Schlegel, Christoph
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 19.07.2024
Subjects
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
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Summary:We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and sybil-proof mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a highest-value bidder are not sybil-proof or not incentive compatible.
DOI:10.48550/arxiv.2407.14485