The Pass-through of Retail Crime

This paper shows that retailers increase prices in response to organized retail crime. We match store-level crime data to scanner data from the universe of transactions for cannabis retailers in Washington state. Using quasi-experimental variation from robberies and burglaries, we find a 1.5-1.8% pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors Hase, Carl, Kasinger, Johannes
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 09.07.2024
Subjects
Quantitative Finance - Economics
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Summary:This paper shows that retailers increase prices in response to organized retail crime. We match store-level crime data to scanner data from the universe of transactions for cannabis retailers in Washington state. Using quasi-experimental variation from robberies and burglaries, we find a 1.5-1.8% price increase at victimized stores and nearby competitors. This rise is not driven by short-to-medium-term demand changes but is consistent with an own-cost shock. Effects are larger for independent stores and less concentrated markets. We estimate that crime imposes a 1% "hidden" unit tax on affected stores, implying $33.9 million additional social costs, primarily borne by consumers.
DOI:10.48550/arxiv.2407.07201