Analyzing Human Observer Ability in Morphing Attack Detection -- Where Do We Stand?
Few studies have focused on examining how people recognize morphing attacks, even as several publications have examined the susceptibility of automated FRS and offered morphing attack detection (MAD) approaches. MAD approaches base their decisions either on a single image with no reference to compar...
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Main Authors | , , , , , |
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Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
24.02.2022
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
DOI | 10.48550/arxiv.2202.12426 |
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Summary: | Few studies have focused on examining how people recognize morphing attacks,
even as several publications have examined the susceptibility of automated FRS
and offered morphing attack detection (MAD) approaches. MAD approaches base
their decisions either on a single image with no reference to compare against
(S-MAD) or using a reference image (D-MAD). One prevalent misconception is that
an examiner's or observer's capacity for facial morph detection depends on
their subject expertise, experience, and familiarity with the issue and that no
works have reported the specific results of observers who regularly verify
identity (ID) documents for their jobs. As human observers are involved in
checking the ID documents having facial images, a lapse in their competence can
have significant societal challenges. To assess the observers' proficiency,
this work first builds a new benchmark database of realistic morphing attacks
from 48 different subjects, resulting in 400 morphed images. We also capture
images from Automated Border Control (ABC) gates to mimic the realistic
border-crossing scenarios in the D-MAD setting with 400 probe images to study
the ability of human observers to detect morphed images. A new dataset of 180
morphing images is also produced to research human capacity in the S-MAD
environment. In addition to creating a new evaluation platform to conduct S-MAD
and D-MAD analysis, the study employs 469 observers for D-MAD and 410 observers
for S-MAD who are primarily governmental employees from more than 40 countries,
along with 103 subjects who are not examiners. The analysis offers intriguing
insights and highlights the lack of expertise and failure to recognize a
sizable number of morphing attacks by experts. The results of this study are
intended to aid in the development of training programs to prevent security
failures while determining whether an image is bona fide or altered. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2202.12426 |