argXtract: Deriving IoT Security Configurations via Automated Static Analysis of Stripped ARM Binaries
Recent high-profile attacks on the Internet of Things (IoT) have brought to the forefront the vulnerability of "smart" devices, and have resulted in numerous IoT-focused security analyses. Many of the attacks had weak device configuration as the root cause. One potential source of rich and...
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Main Authors | , |
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Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
07.05.2021
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
DOI | 10.48550/arxiv.2105.03135 |
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Summary: | Recent high-profile attacks on the Internet of Things (IoT) have brought to
the forefront the vulnerability of "smart" devices, and have resulted in
numerous IoT-focused security analyses. Many of the attacks had weak device
configuration as the root cause. One potential source of rich and definitive
information about the configuration of an IoT device is the device's firmware.
However, firmware analysis is complex and automated firmware analyses have thus
far been confined to devices with more traditional operating systems such as
Linux or VxWorks. Most IoT peripherals, due to lacking traditional operating
systems and implementing a wide variety of communication technologies, have
only been the subject of smaller-scale analyses. Peripheral firmware analysis
is further complicated by the fact that such firmware files are predominantly
available as stripped binaries, without the ELF headers and symbol tables that
would simplify reverse engineering.
In this paper, we present argXtract, an open-source automated static analysis
tool, which extracts security-relevant configuration information from stripped
IoT peripheral firmware. Specifically, we focus on binaries that target the ARM
Cortex-M architecture, due to its growing popularity among IoT peripherals.
argXtract overcomes the challenges associated with stripped Cortex-M analysis
and is able to retrieve arguments to security-relevant supervisor and function
calls, enabling automated bulk analysis of firmware files. We demonstrate this
via three real-world case studies. The largest case study covers a dataset of
243 Bluetooth Low Energy binaries targeting Nordic Semiconductor chipsets,
while the other two focus on Nordic ANT and STMicroelectronics BlueNRG
binaries. The results reveal widespread lack of security and privacy controls
in IoT, such as minimal or no protection for data, fixed passkeys and trackable
device addresses. |
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DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2105.03135 |