On Privacy of Socially Contagious Attributes
A commonly used method to protect user privacy in data collection is to perform randomized perturbation on user's real data before collection so that aggregated statistics can still be inferred without endangering secrets held by individuals. In this paper, we take a closer look at the validity...
Saved in:
Main Authors | , |
---|---|
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
02.09.2019
|
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
DOI | 10.48550/arxiv.1909.00543 |
Cover
Loading…
Summary: | A commonly used method to protect user privacy in data collection is to
perform randomized perturbation on user's real data before collection so that
aggregated statistics can still be inferred without endangering secrets held by
individuals. In this paper, we take a closer look at the validity of
Differential Privacy guarantees, when the sensitive attributes are subject to
social influence and contagions. We first show that in the absence of any
knowledge about the contagion network, an adversary that tries to predict the
real values from perturbed ones, cannot achieve an area under the ROC curve
(AUC) above $1-(1-\delta)/(1+e^\varepsilon)$, if the dataset is perturbed using
an $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-differentially private mechanism. Then, we show that
with the knowledge of the contagion network and model, one can do significantly
better. We demonstrate that our method passes the performance limit imposed by
differential privacy. Our experiments also reveal that nodes with high
influence on others are at more risk of revealing their secrets than others.
The performance is shown through extensive experiments on synthetic and
real-world networks. |
---|---|
DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.1909.00543 |