Attacking Power Indices by Manipulating Player Reliability

We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the problem is often tractable for so-called network centrality...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors Istrate, Gabriel, Bonchiş, Cosmin, Brînduşescu, Alin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 04.03.2019
Subjects
Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Computer Science - Multiagent Systems
Computer Science - Social and Information Networks
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DOI10.48550/arxiv.1903.01165

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Summary:We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the problem is often tractable for so-called network centrality games and influence attribution games, as well as an example when optimal manipulation is intractable, even though computing power indices is feasible.
DOI:10.48550/arxiv.1903.01165