Nudge: Intermediaries’ Role in Interdependent Network Security

By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security and trustworthiness of the overall system. We discuss two different forms of intervention: rebates in comb...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inTrust and Trustworthy Computing pp. 323 - 336
Main Authors Grossklags, Jens, Radosavac, Svetlana, Cárdenas, Alvaro A., Chuang, John
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Subjects
Enhancing Trust and Security with End Users
Internet Service Provider Incentives
Security Economics
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Summary:By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security and trustworthiness of the overall system. We discuss two different forms of intervention: rebates in combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and cost-subsidies (pay for effort).
Bibliography:We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments to an earlier version of this paper. This work is supported in part by a University of California MICRO project grant in collaboration with DoCoMo USA Labs. This paper is an extended version of a prior abstract contribution [19].
ISBN:3642138683
9783642138683
ISSN:0302-9743
1611-3349
DOI:10.1007/978-3-642-13869-0_24