Identity-Based Encryption Resilient to Continual Leakage Without Random Oracles

• Published in: Frontiers in Cyber Security pp. 53 - 64
• Main Authors: Guo, Yuyan, Jiang, Mingming, Wei, Shimin, Xie, Ming, Sun, Mei
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English
• Published: Singapore Springer Singapore
• Series: Communications in Computer and Information Science
• Subjects: Continual leakage; Identity-based encryption; Key encapsulation mechanism
• ISBN: 9811508178; 9789811508172
• ISSN: 1865-0929; 1865-0937
• DOI: 10.1007/978-981-15-0818-9_4

In general, the security of identity-based encryption schemes has been considered under the ideal circumstances, where the adversaries do not acquire the secret internal state of the schemes. However, the adversaries can obtain partial information for the secret key through the various key leakage attacks in reality. In order to further describe the continual leakage attack, we formally define a secure model for identity-based encryption. The adversary is allowed to continuously acquire part of the secret information through the continual leakage attack in the secure model. Then we give a new type identity-based encryption scheme resilient to continual leakage. This scheme which is based on an identity-based key encapsulation mechanism is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack under the hardness of the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem in the standard model. This proposed scheme enhances the continual leakage-resilient property and enjoys less computation cost.