CODA: China and America-The Way We Live Now

• Published in: World policy journal Vol. 16; no. 3; p. 127
• Main Author: Chace, James
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Durham Duke University Press, NC & IL 01.01.1999
• Subjects: China; International; International relations; China
• ISSN: 0740-2775; 1936-0924

It is commonly believed that there is a split between the pro-American forces in the Chinese government, which are generally identified with Prime Minister Zhu Ronghi, and others who are closely aligned with the military and who are willing to risk worsening relations with America if Washington supports Taiwanese calls for independence or steps up its criticisms of China's abuse of human rights. Zhu's visit to the United States earlier this year was a near disaster. He arrived expecting support from President Clinton on China's admittance to the World Trade Organization. When the president caved in to domestic pressures, especially from labor unions, and reversed himself on this issue, it was a public humiliation for Zhu, who nonetheless campaigned for his cause across the United States. By the end of the Zhu's trip, Clinton had reversed himself again, but the Chinese-American relationship was badly tarnished. At home, Zhu came under severe criticism for having made a number of concessions to allow American goods into China in order to get U.S. backing for China's bid for WTO membership, and now he seemed a dupe. The suspicion with which the Chinese hard-liners view Washington was only slightly alleviated by Secretary Albright's reaffirmation of Beijing's position that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should be considered a single country, the so-called one-China policy. The latest flap over the definition of Taiwan's status came on July 9, when Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, declared that Taiwan was redefining its ties to the mainland as a 'state to state' relationship. Since Beijing regards Taiwan as a renegade province (and the United States supports reunification of Taiwan with China under peaceful conditions), any movement by the Taiwanese to declare the island an independent state might well trigger a military response from the mainland. When Lee Teng-hui hinted at a change in status that could lead to independence during the prelude to Taiwan's presidential elections in the spring of 1996, the mainland Chinese lobbed missiles into the sea near Taiwan. In response, the United States sent a warship to the area as a warning that Washington was committed to defending Taiwan against any attack. The Chinese, however, do not have the naval capability to mount an amphibious assault on Taiwan; and a naval blockade could result in a head-on collision with foreign shipping. A recent Pentagon report stated that any full-scale amphibious invasion that China might launch across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait would face horrific obstacles. Less polite analysts have predicted that it would end up as a 'million-man swim.' 4 Beijing might give the order to seize one of the small islands adjacent to China's southern coast, Kinmen and Matsu, that are controlled by Taiwan. But this would also lead to trouble because, by statute, the United States cannot deny Taiwan military aid to defend itself, though it could certainly try to delay providing it as long as possible. Given the limited military capabilities on both sides, it is more likely that the Chinese leadership would insist on economic sanctions, for example, shutting down Taiwanese companies that supported Lee Teng-hui's position.