A Novel Payoff Distribution Procedure for Sustainable Cooperation in an Extensive Game with Payoffs at All Nodes

• Published in: Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research Vol. 13367; pp. 279 - 294
• Main Authors: Kuzyutin, Denis, Smirnova, Nadezhda
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English
• Published: Switzerland Springer International Publishing AG 2022; Springer International Publishing
• Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• Subjects: Cooperative solution; Core; Extensive-form game; Fishery-management model; Payoff distribution procedure; Subgame-perfect equilibrium
• ISBN: 9783031096068; 3031096061
• ISSN: 0302-9743; 1611-3349
• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-09607-5_20

This paper is a contribution to the problem of sustainable cooperation in an extensive-form game. We study an extension of the subgame-perfect core concept to more broad class of games (when the payoffs are defined at all nodes) which is based on the payoff distribution procedure approach. The properties of this β\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}-S-P Core are studied and algorithm of its implementation in a 2-player game is provided. Using this algorithm we construct specific payoff distribution procedure from the β\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}-S-P Core in an extensive-form version of the fishery-management model with asymmetric players.