In-situ Extraction of Randomness from Computer Architecture Through Hardware Performance Counters

True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) are one of the most crucial components in the design and use of cryptographic protocols and communication. Predictability of such random numbers are catastrophic and can lead to the complete collapse of security, as all the mathematical proofs are based on the e...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSmart Card Research and Advanced Applications Vol. 11833; pp. 3 - 19
Main Authors Alam, Manaar, Singh, Astikey, Bhattacharya, Sarani, Pratihar, Kuheli, Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Switzerland Springer International Publishing AG 2020
Springer International Publishing
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
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Summary:True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) are one of the most crucial components in the design and use of cryptographic protocols and communication. Predictability of such random numbers are catastrophic and can lead to the complete collapse of security, as all the mathematical proofs are based on the entropy of the source which generates these bit patterns. The randomness in the TRNGs is hugely attributed to the inherent noise of the system, which is often derived from hardware subsystems operating in an ambiguous manner. However, most of these solutions need an add-on device to provide these randomness sources, which can lead to not only latency issues but also can be a potential target of adversaries by probing such an interface. In this paper, we address to alleviate these issues by proposing an in-situ TRNG construction, which depends on the functioning of the underlying hardware architecture. These functions are observed via the Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) and are shown to exhibit high-quality randomness in the least significant bit positions. We provide extensive experiments to research on the choice of the HPCs, and their ability to pass the standard NIST and AIS 20/31 Tests. We also analyze a possible scenario where an adversary tries to interfere with the HPC values and show its effect on the TRNG output with respect to the NIST and AIS 20/31 Tests. Additionally, to alleviate the delay caused for accessing the HPC events and increase the throughput of the random-source, we also propose a methodology to cascade the random numbers from the HPC values with a secured hash function.
ISBN:3030420671
9783030420673
ISSN:0302-9743
1611-3349
DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-42068-0_1