Template Attacks in Principal Subspaces

• Published in: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2006 pp. 1 - 14
• Main Authors: Archambeau, C., Peeters, E., Standaert, F. -X., Quisquater, J. -J.
• Format: Book Chapter Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2006; Springer
• Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• Subjects: Applied sciences; Block Cipher; Clock Cycle; Cryptography; Electronics; Exact sciences and technology; FPGA Implementation; Information, signal and communications theory; Integrated circuits; Integrated circuits by function (including memories and processors); Principal Direction; Semiconductor electronics. Microelectronics. Optoelectronics. Solid state devices; Signal and communications theory; Stream Cipher; Telecommunications and information theory; Side channel attack; Energy consumption; Correlation; Electromagnetism; Probabilistic approach; Stream ciphering; Leak; Maximum principle; Field programmable gate array; Modeling; Boarded computer; Power consumption; Gaussian noise; Vector space; Block ciphering; Heuristic method; Cryptanalysis; Minimal distance; Maximum likelihood; Safety; Cryptography
• ISBN: 9783540465591; 3540465596
• ISSN: 0302-9743; 1611-3349
• DOI: 10.1007/11894063_1

Side-channel attacks are a serious threat to implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Secret information is recovered based on power consumption, electromagnetic emanations or any other form of physical information leakage. Template attacks are probabilistic side-channel attacks, which assume a Gaussian noise model. Using the maximum likelihood principle enables us to reveal (part of) the secret for each set of recordings (i.e., leakage trace). In practice, however, the major concerns are (i) how to select the points of interest of the traces, (ii) how to choose the minimal distance between these points, and (iii) how many points of interest are needed for attacking. So far, only heuristics were provided. In this work, we propose to perform template attacks in the principal subspace of the traces. This new type of attack addresses all practical issues in principled way and automatically. The approach is validated by attacking stream ciphers such as RC4. We also report analysis results of template style attacks against an FPGA implementation of AES Rijndael. Roughly, the template attack we carried out requires five time less encrypted messages than the best reported correlation attack against similar block cipher implementations.