Return Address Randomization Scheme for Annuling Data-Injection Buffer Overflow Attacks
Buffer overflow(BOF) has been the most common form of vulnerability in software systems today, and many methods exist to defend software systems against BOF attacks. Among them, the instruction set randomization scheme, which makes attacker not to know the specific instruction set of the target mach...
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Published in | Information Security and Cryptology pp. 238 - 252 |
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Main Authors | , , , |
Format | Book Chapter Conference Proceeding |
Language | English |
Published |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2006
Springer |
Series | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Buffer overflow(BOF) has been the most common form of vulnerability in software systems today, and many methods exist to defend software systems against BOF attacks. Among them, the instruction set randomization scheme, which makes attacker not to know the specific instruction set of the target machine, is the most promising defense scheme because it defends all typical code-injection BOF attacks. However, this defense scheme can not cover data-injection BOF attacks like return-into-libc attacks. In order to defend against the data-injection BOF attacks as well as the code-injection BOF attacks, we propose an enhanced defense scheme randomizing not only the instruction sets but also the return addresses. Implementation results show that the proposed scheme can defend software systems against data-injection BOF attacks as well as code-injection BOF attacks without significant extra overheads. |
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Bibliography: | This research was supported by the MIC(Ministry of Information and Communication), Korea, under the ITRC (Information Technology Research Center) support program supervised by the IITA (Institue of Information Technology Assessment)(IITA-2005-C1090-0501-0018). |
ISBN: | 3540496084 9783540496083 |
ISSN: | 0302-9743 1611-3349 |
DOI: | 10.1007/11937807_19 |