Pleading and the dilemmas of modern American procedure

The argument (made by some lower courts and scholars) that die standards emerging from Twombly should and could be confined to antitrust conspiracy cases confronted the foundational assumptions diat die Federal Rules are transsubstantive and diat they cannot be amended by judicial interpretation. [....

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJudicature Vol. 93; no. 3; pp. 109 - 120
Main Author Burbank, Stephen B
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chicago Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies 01.11.2009
Subjects
Criminal pleas
Criminal procedure
Judicial discretion
Judicial process
Legal procedure
United States Supreme court
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:The argument (made by some lower courts and scholars) that die standards emerging from Twombly should and could be confined to antitrust conspiracy cases confronted the foundational assumptions diat die Federal Rules are transsubstantive and diat they cannot be amended by judicial interpretation. [...] - on die view that those standards do in fact represent a change through judicial interpretation - the Supreme Court acting as such under Article III is ill-equipped to gather the range of empirical data, and lacks the practical experience, that should be brought to bear on the questions of policy, procedural and substantive, diat are implicated in considering standards for the adequacy of pleadings even in a discrete substantive context.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0022-5800