Sensor network hardware security

Wireless sensor networks are distributed networks consisting of many tiny sensor nodes with limited resources. These networks play an extremely important role in people’s modern lives. Despite their great application, one of the critical issues in their design and operation is the security of sensor...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inAIP conference proceedings Vol. 2570; no. 1
Main Author Tsvetanov, Filip
Format Journal Article Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published Melville American Institute of Physics 18.08.2022
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:Wireless sensor networks are distributed networks consisting of many tiny sensor nodes with limited resources. These networks play an extremely important role in people’s modern lives. Despite their great application, one of the critical issues in their design and operation is the security of sensor nodes, data, and entire network fragments. Security breaches through software attacks on sensor networks are currently the subject of much research by academia and the research community. Hardware Trojans (HTH) are malicious changes to hardware specifications during design or production in a way that alters the functionality of IC integrated circuits under conditions specified by the attacker. The discovery of HTH is a particularly difficult task in modern submicron technologies due to their intensive development. Our research shows that security threats and attacks based on hardware building sensor networks are real and not yet sufficiently studied, which is why this work focuses on the specifics of identifying this type of threat. The paper discusses and classifies hardware- specific hardware attacks. As a result of the study, some approaches to increase sensor networks’ hardware security have been identified and proposed. The results obtained in this work can be used to improve the means of protection of wireless sensor networks against various cyber-physical attacks.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Conference Proceeding-1
SourceType-Conference Papers & Proceedings-1
content type line 21
ISSN:0094-243X
1551-7616
DOI:10.1063/5.0099518