외국인 주요주주의 특성과 회사채 신용등급

• Published in: 대한경영학회지 Vol. 31; no. 8; pp. 1509 - 1526
• Main Author: 김유진(Yu-Jin Kim)
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: Korean
• Published: 대한경영학회 01.08.2018
• Subjects: 경영학; Shareholder activism; 외국인투자자; Foreign investor; 신용등급; 주요주주; 재무적 투자자; Strategic investor; Credit rating; 전략적 투자자; Financial investor
• ISSN: 1226-2234; 2465-8839
• DOI: 10.18032/kaaba.2018.31.8.1509

본 연구에서는 기업지배구조 차원에서 외국인 주요주주의 투자 목적에 따른 특성 차이가 회사채 신용등급에미치는 영향에 대해 분석하였다. 5% 이상의 지분을 보유한 외국인 주요주주가 경영자에 대한 감시의 역할을적절히 수행할 경우 대리인 문제가 축소되면서 기업은 보다 양호한 신용등급을 받을 가능성이 높다. 특히단기 투자 수익에 관심을 두는 재무적 투자자 대비 장기적 관점에서 경영 참여 목적을 가진 전략적 투자자의주주행동주의가 더욱 강하게 나타날 것으로 기대된다. 분석 결과 외국인 주요주주의 존재는 신용등급에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 재무적투자자와 전략적 투자자로 구분하여 살펴본 결과, 재무적 투자자가 회사채 신용등급에 의미 있는 영향을 미치지못하는 반면, 전략적 투자자는 신용등급에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 즉, 외국인 주요주주가 신용등급에 미치는 양(+)의 영향은 전략적 투자자에 국한되며, 이는 전략적 투자자가 재무적 투자자 대비주요주주로서 기업지배구조 개선을 위한 역할을 적절히 수행하고 있다는 것을 의미한다. 본 연구는 거대한 자본력과 우수한 정보력을 바탕으로 영향력 있는 역할을 할 것으로 기대되는 외국인주요주주에 초점을 두고 회사채 신용등급과의 관계를 밝혔다는 것에 의의가 있다. 특히 외국인 주요주주를투자 목적에 따라 구분하고, 각 주체가 신용등급에 미치는 영향을 비교분석함으로써 외국인 주요주주가 가지는양면적 특성에 대한 이해를 넓힌다. 이를 통해 규제기관이 외국인투자자에 대한 제도 및 관리체계를 정립하는과정에서 투자자 속성별로 차별화된 시각이 필요하다는 주장의 논거를 제공한다. This study examines the association between foreign blockholders and the credit ratings. Shareholder activism refers to the act of shareholders actively engaging in the management activities of the firm. This can alleviate the agency problem between shareholders and managers and ultimately enhance shareholder value by raising firm value. In the viewpoint of shareholder activism, when the foreign blockholders play a role of monitoring, it is expected that firms will be given a better credit ratings as the agent problem is alleviated. Furthermore, if distinguishing foreign investors by their attributes, they are classified as strategic investors with management participation objectives and financial investors who are interested in short-term investment returns(dividend, return on investment etc.). The impact on credit ratings is expected to be different for each investor. As a result, the existence of foreign blockholders positively affects the credit ratings, and the positive role of foreign investors as blockholders is more strong in strategic investors. In other words, the presence of financial investors is not significantly related to the credit ratings, while strategic investors have a positive effect on the credit ratings. In conclusion, a positive effect of foreign blockholders with more than 5% stake on the credit ratings is limited to strategic investors. This implies that strategic investors are playing a role in improving corporate governance as blockholders compared to financial investors. However, it can be interpreted that the foreign investor as blockholders did not reduce the agency cost of the investee firms, but that the foreign blockholders had invested in a firm with high credit ratings. In other words, the question of self-selection bias can be raised. Therefore, in order to secure the robustness of this study, the effects of major shareholders conversion is additionally analyzed. As a result of the analysis, in the case of firms with no foreign blockholders in year t-1, but with the transition of the foreign blockholders to major shareholders in year t, credit ratings is high. This is evidence supporting the claim that the foreign blockholders plays a role of improving corporate governance, which significantly controls moral hazard incentives such as privileged consumption or over-investment of CEO. This study sheds new light on the monitoring role of the foreign investor as a shareholder. It is meaningful to conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis on shareholder activism of foreign investor by examining the effect of foreign blockholders on the credit rating. In particular, we try to distinguish the foreign blockholders by attributes and analyze the effect of each subject on the credit ratings. And we will improve the understanding of the differences among the attributes of foreign investors. Therefore, we suggest an opinion of that it is necessary to establish a different management system that supervisory agencies can monitor and supervise financial and strategic investors. KCI Citation Count: 4