The Effect of Control-Ownership Disparity on Cost Stickiness

• Published in: Journal of distribution science Vol. 14; no. 8; pp. 51 - 57
• Main Authors: Chae, Soo-Joon, Ryu, Hae-Young
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: Korean
• Published: 30.08.2016
• Subjects: Chaebol; Agency Problem; Cost Stickiness; Control-Ownership Disparity; Wedge; Cost Behavior
• ISSN: 1738-3110; 2093-7717

Purpose - If control-ownership disparity is large, managers will not actively reduce costs; rather, they will maintain unutilized resources or possess surplus resources even when sales decrease with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige. These managers' utility maximizing tendencies cause cost stickiness. We examine whether asymmetric behavior related to costs becomes stronger when there is a large disparity between ownership and control rights. Research design, data, and methodology - We construct a regression model to examine the relationship between control-ownership disparity and cost stickiness. STICKY, a dependent variable representing cost stickiness is a value found using the method of Weiss (2010), and Disparity is an interest variable that shows control-ownership disparity. Results - This study is based from the unique situations in Korea, in which high control-ownership disparity is common in firms. Large control-ownership disparity was found to increase cost stickiness of corporations. Conclusions - The results of this study imply that controlling shareholders may be regarded as a threat to the interests of minority shareholders and corporate values especially when controlling shareholders have significant influence over managers or the power to make managerial decisions as owners of a corporation.